89-994 -- DISSENT VIRGINIA UNIV. HOSPITALS, INC. v. CASEY, page 9
Justice Marshall, dissenting
As Justice Stevens demonstrates, the Court uses the implements of literalism to wound, rather than to minister to, congressional intent in this case. That is a dangerous
usurpation of congressional power when any statute is involved. It is troubling for special reasons, however, when the statute at issue is clearly designed to give access to the federal courts to persons and groups attempting to vindicate vital civil rights. A District Judge has ably put the point in an
analogous context:
"At issue here is much more than the simple question of how much [plaintiff's] attorneys should receive as
attorney fees. At issue is . . . continued full and vigorous commitment to this Nation's lofty, but as yet unfulfilled, agenda to make the promises of this land available to all citizens, without regard to race or sex or other
impermissible characteristic. There are at least two ways to undermine this commitment. The first is open and
direct: a repeal of this Nation's anti-discrimination laws. The second is more indirect and, for this reason,
somewhat insidious: to deny victims of discrimination a means for redress by creating an economic market in which
attorneys cannot afford to represent them and take their cases to court." Hidle v. Geneva County Bd. of Ed., 681 F. Supp. 752, 758-759 (MD Ala. 1988) (awarding
attorney fees and expenses under Title VII)
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